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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
ANTITRUST - PRIVATE ACTIONS - TREBLE DAMAGES - GROUP BOYCOTT
- "No-SWITCHING" AGREEMENTS AMONG COMPETITORS IS A PER SE
OFFENSE - PLAINTIFF WHO FAILED TO GAIN EMPLOYMENT THEREBY IS
INJURED WITHIN HIS BUSINESS OR PROPERTY AND STATES A CLAIM
UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED.
Quinonez v. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
(5th Cir. 1976)
Plaintiff brought a private antitrust action' against defendants2 for
treble damages3 and injunctive relief' in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas.' Plaintiff was accepted by Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc. (Merrill Lynch) into a program designed to
1. Plaintiff alleged violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2
(1970). Quinonez v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 540 F.2d 824, 826 (5th Cir. 1976).
The facts set forth in Chief Judge John R. Brown's opinion allegedly revealed a group
boycott prohibited by section 1. Id. at 827-28. The § 2 claim was not clearly set forth
but most likely alleged a conspiracy to monopolize.
Plaintiff also alleged that the member firms (the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc., (NASD), New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock
Exchange, Chicago Board of Trade, Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and probably
others) had monopolized the securities business which constituted a separate section 2
violation. Id. at 827. Plaintiff apparently did not press this claim, because the Fifth
Circuit did not discuss it.
2. Among the named defendants were: NASD; Bache & Co.; DuPont; A. G.
Edwards Co.; Institutional Equity Corp.; Merrill Lynch Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
(Merrill Lynch); and Shearson, Hammill & Co. (Shearson), 540 F.2d at 826.
3. Treble damages are authorized by § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1973),
which states: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained .... " Id.
4. Injunctive relief is authorized by § 16 of the Clayton Act which reads in
pertinent part:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have
injunctive relief . . . against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the
antitrust laws ... when and under the same conditions and principles as
injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is
granted by courts of equity ....
15 U.S.C. §26 (1970).
In addressing the plaintiff's claim for relief under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1970), the Fifth Circuit dealt solely with the "business or property"
requirement for treble damage litigants. It did not consider the plaintiffs cause of
action for the requested injunctive relief under the different statutory standard of § 16
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970), which does not, notably, require an injury to
"business or property." See id; In re Multidist. Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31,
481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom. Morgan v. Automobile Mfr. Ass'n, 414
U.S. 1045 (1973). The Ninth Circuit stated that
section 16 lacks mention of 'business or property', an omission signalling
different standing requirements. This treatment is fully justified by the
difference between the remedies available under each section. In contrast to
section 4, section 16 does not involve punitive and potentially disastrous
judgments for treble damages and attorneys' fees; neither is there the potential
threat of duplicative recoveries.
481 F.2d at 130. See also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 431 F.2d 1282, 1284-85 (9th Cir.
1970), aff'd, 405 U.S. 251, 261-64 (1972); Bratcher v. Board of Realtors, 381 F.2d 723,
724 (6th Cir. 1967).
5. Appended to plaintiff's federal claim were alleged violations of state antitrust
law, a negligence claim, and a breach of contract claim. 540 F.2d at 826 n.1.
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train applicants to become registered securities representatives under
industry-wide standards and was assigned to their Panama office. 6
However, his employment was terminated when Merrill Lynch reconsidered
plaintiffs prior involvements with criminal charges as noted on his
employment application? Subsequently, plaintiff obtained a trainee position
with Shearson, Hammill & Co. (Shearson).' Once again he was discharged,
but not prior to passing the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)/National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) examinations with high marks.9
Plaintiff asserted that employment applications sent to other defendant
broker-dealer firms were rejected because of an alleged "no-switching"
agreement among defendants, i.e., that none would employ any person
previously fired or rejected by another member firm. 10 Defendants' motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted" was
sustained in district court. 12 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for trial, holding that plaintiffs
complaint alleged a per se offense under the Sherman Act which caused
injury to his "business or property" within the meaning of section 4 of the
Clayton Act sufficient to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 3
Quinonez v. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., 540 F.2d 824
(5th Cir. 1976).
Certain forms of business activities, encompassing concerted refusals to
deal or "group boycotts", are per se violations under section 1 of the
Sherman Act.'4 While private treble damage litigants who allege acts which
are per se unlawful under the Sherman Act need not prove an injury to the
public aside from their own damages,1 5 they must prove injury to their
"business or property" within section 4 of the Clayton Act."6 The prevailing
6. Id. at 827.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. Shearson had informed plaintiff that he would not be hired, but allowed
him to be certified for his exams. Id. at 827 n.5.
10. Id. at 827.
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
12. 540 F.2d at 826. The district court opinion is not reported.
13. The Fifth Circuit reached this result despite the fact that plaintiff never had a
client or earned a sales commission as a securities representative. 540 F.2d at 827.
Plaintiff completed his necessary training and was certified, but was never given
clients. Id. It is submitted that the fact that plaintiff had no work product to speak of
with any firm is crucial to the issue presented in the instant case. See notes 43-45 and
accompanying text infra.
14. Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 468 (1941)
(reasonableness of boycott as irrelevant as the reasonableness of prices fixed by
conspiracy); E. States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600,
612-13 (1914) (group boycotts are in the class of prohibited restraints).
Section 1 of the Sherman Act reads in pertinent part: "Every contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States . . . is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
15. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961);
Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
16. See note 3 supra. In fact, some courts have construed the "business property"
requirement as a standing rule. See Southern Concrete Co. v. United States Steel
Corp., 394 F. Supp. 362 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd, 535 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1975); Raubal v.
Engelhard Minerals & Chemicals Corp., 364 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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construction of the word "business" by the courts has been a commercial
venture or an ongoing business enterprise. 17 The major exception to the
"ongoing commercial enterprise" test has been where the plaintiff alleged
that he was prevented from establishing a new business by means of a
group boycott. 18 The Fifth Circuit in Martin v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,19
stated this rule as follows:
[O]ne need not have an actual ongoing business to obtain standing, but
an attempt to enter a business is sufficient. . . . However, [the] decisions
lay down two significant requirements. First, there must be the
intention to enter the business; and second, there must be a showing of
preparedness to enter the business.2 0
Another exception to the "ongoing commercial enterprise" test permits
recovery of treble damages by reason of loss of employment caused by an
antitrust violation where the plaintiff has been a commission salesman who
has cultivated a clientele.2 While all the other courts employing this
exception stressed the fact that plaintiffs were commission salesmen with
17. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972). In Hawaii, the only Supreme
Court decision on this issue, the Court stated: "Like the lower courts that have
considered the meaning of the words 'business or property,' we conclude that they
refer to commercial interests or enterprises." Id. at 264. This is the settled view of the
lower federal courts. See In re Multidist. Vehicle Air Pollution M. D. L. No. 31, 481
F.2d 122, 126 (9th Cir.) cert. denied sub. nom, Morgan v. Automobile Mfr. Ass'n., Inc.,
414 U.S. 1045 (1973); GAF Corp. v. Circle Floor Co., 463 F.2d 752, 757-58 (2d Cir.
1972); Rossman v. Pullman Co., 15 F. Supp. 325, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1936) (the seminal post-
Clayton Act case on the question).
18. See Martin v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 365 F.2d 629, 633-34 (5th Cir. 1966); Duff
v. Kansas City Star Co., 299 F.2d 320, 323 (8th Cir. 1962); Peller v. International
Boxing Club, 227 F.2d 593, 596 (7th Cir. 1955); Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v.
National Elec. Prod. Corp., 152 F.2d 398, 399 (3d Cir. 1945) ("intent and preparedness"
rule first formulated, denying relief to the plaintiff).
19. 365 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1966).
20. 365 F.2d at 633. In this case, the plaintiff Martin had a suboption to purchase
a gasoline processing plant, but needed financing which was being arranged by the
defendant Chemical Bank of New York. Id. at 631. Negotiations fell through when the
bank informed Martin that it would require that defendant Phillips Petroleum
Company operate the plant and be given a 50% interest. Id. at 632. The bank claimed
that Martin, an independent oil and gas explorer and producer, had insufficient
experience to run a refinery. Id. Martin objected, claiming a conspiracy between the
bank and Phillips, a large depositor. Id. Martin was unable to get financing from
other sources before his suboption expired. Id. In deciding that Martin did not satisfy
the "intent and preparedness" rule, the Fifth Circuit stressed the fact that Martin had
no prior experience, no ability to finance, and had not invested in the proposed
business. Id. at 633-34.
The Martin court went on to say that "[s]ome of the elements considered by
the courts include. . . affirmative action by plaintiff to enter the business ... and the
background and experience of plaintiff in the prospective business .... " Id.
(citations omitted). For other statements concerning the meaning of the "intent and
preparedness" rule, see cases cited in note 17 supra.
21. See Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484, 487 (5th Cir. 1967);
Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, 371 F.2d 332, 334 (7th Cir. 1967); Vines v. General
Outdoor Advertising Co., 171 F.2d 487, 491 (2d Cir. 1948); Roseland v. Phister Mfg.
Co., 125 F.2d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1942); Image & Sound Serv. Corp. v. Altec Serv. Corp.,
148 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D. Mass. 1956).
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established clients,22 the Seventh Circuit in Nichols v. Spencer International
Press2 3 minimized the importance of those facts:
[W]e readily conclude that one who has been damaged by loss of
employment as a result of a violation of the antitrust laws is "injured in
his business or property" and thus entitled to recover, under 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 15. Work as the employee of another is not, indeed, an independent
business enterprise, and an opportunity to perform such work may not
be property in the ordinary sense, but the interest invaded by a wrongful
act resulting in loss of employment is so closely akin to the interest
invaded by impairment of one's business as to be indistinguishable in
this context.2 4 '
The Seventh Circuit's rationale for treating all losses of employment as
injuries to a "business or property" interest for Clayton Act purposes was
implicitly rejected by the Fifth Circuit five months later in Daily v. Quality
School Plan, Inc.2 5 In Dailey, plaintiff was a successful commission sales
supervisor discharged by Educational Reader's Service, Inc.26 The Dailey
court held that plaintiffs position was a "business or property" interest
giving him a claim upon which treble damage relief could be granted for
alleged section 1 Sherman Act and section 7 Clayton Act violations,
27
because of the crucial fact that plaintiff was a commission sales agent.
28
Thus, the Fifth Circuit's disposition of Quinonez was the first time a federal
court of appeals held that the term "business or property" recognized
exclusion from potential employment to be a legal injury as distinguished
from the loss of existing employment.
29
22. See note 21 supra.
23. 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967). The facts of Nichols were remarkably similar to
the instant case. There, plaintiff was a sales supervisor employed by defendant P. F.
Collier, Inc., encyclopedia distributors, until he was discharged without notice or
cause. Id. at 333. He was later employed in a similar capacity by a competitor of
Collier's, defendant Spencer International Press, but was discharged after a month,
allegedly because of adherence to a "no-switching" policy in the industry. Id. The only
real difference between the plaintiff in Nichols and the plaintiff in the instant case is
that the former had established sales commissions and clients while the latter did not.
Id. at 333-34.
24. Id. at 334.
25. 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967).
26. Id. at 485-86. In 1965, Educational Reader's Service was acquired by a
competitor, defendant Quality School Plan, Inc. Id. at 485. Together, the two firms
had 82% of the relevant market. Id. at 486. Plaintiff was fired later in 1965 so that
Quality personnel could take over his sales area. Id.
27. 380 F.2d at 487.
28. Id. The Dailey court stated that:
These commission sales agent cases where a territory has been developed and
where the courts treat the employment] relationship as the business of the
salesman or sales manager are to be distinguished from those cases where the
business or property is that of the corporation and the claim asserted by
stockholders or creditors or employees is derivative.
Id. at 487. By stressing plaintiffs position as a commission sales agent with an
established clientele, the court implicitly declined to embrace the broad dicta in
Nichols that brought all employment relationships within the Clayton Act. See text
accompanying note 24 supra.
29. 540 F.2d at 830.
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The Quinonez court also found that the complaint stated a per se claim
under the Sherman Act.30 Invocation of the per se rule meant that the
complaint could state a claim without any allegation of public injury,
31
thereby leaving only the "business or property" Clayton Act requirement to
fulfill.
The court's holding that Quinonez had stated a claim upon which relief
could be granted was based on the following crucial language: "Defendants
attempt to distinguish Vines, Nichols, and Roseland ... on the basis that in
those cases the plaintiffs were commission salesmen who had established
their own clientele which gave them a more clearly defined claim to income
generated from those sources. But this is a distinction without a difference
.... "32 The court asserted that Quinonez was likewise deprived of "income
earning potential" due to "his demonstrated capacity for immediate entry
into this business. '3 3 In support of its holding, the Fifth Circuit also cited
the Nichols dicta 34 which contended that any loss of employment is injury to
"business or property. '35 Finally, the court found that Quinonez had
satisfied the "intent and preparedness" rule:36 "Clearly, the conduct of the
plaintiff in accepting employment with Merrill Lynch and subsequently
Shearson demonstrated not only intent but the fact that the plaintiff
satisfactorily completed the examinations necessary to become a registered
representative.
'8 7
It is submitted that the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Quinonez is
subject to criticism for its questionable interpretation of precedent 38 and its
failure to consider two additional issues. First, the court held that a "no-
switching" agreement between competitors was similar to a group boycott
and therefore was a per se Sherman Act offense.39 However, in support of
this conclusion, the court cited precedents which stand for the opposite
proposition, namely that such agreements were to be tested under the "rule
30. Id. at 828-29. See note 40 infra. The court sought to frame its opinion around
the standards for a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The court stated: "A motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim should not be granted unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff
would not be entitled to recover under any state of facts which could be proved in
support of his claim." 540 F.2d at 826-27, quoting Cook & Nichol, Inc. v. Plimsoll
Club, 451 F.2d 505, 506 (5th Cir. 1971).
31. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
32. 540 F.2d at 829-30 (emphasis added). See note 21 and accompanying text
supra; see also notes 44 & 45 and accompanying text infra.
33. Id. at 830.
34. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
35. 540 F.2d at 830.
36. Id., citing Martin v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 365 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1966), and
North Texas Producers Ass'n v. Young, 308 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1962). However, only
Martin speaks of the "intent and preparedness" rule. 365 F.2d at 633. See note 18 and
accompanying text supra.
37. 540 F.2d at 830. Even while holding that the plaintiff stated a claim upon
which relief could be granted and remanding for trial, the court expressed some
skepticism of plaintiff's ability to prove a right to recover in the conclusion of its
opinion. Id. at 830-31.
38. See notes 40 & 44 infra.
39. 540 F.2d at 828.
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of reason." 40 Secondly, the court did not discuss plaintiffs claim for
injunctive relief.41 Finally, in its discussion of relief, the Fifth Circuit did not
address the possibility of injury to plaintiffs "property" as distinct from his
"business".
42
However, the crucial question in the case sub judice was whether
Quinonez's loss of employment represented an injury to his "business"
interest. While prior courts that allowed recovery in loss of employment
40. Id. Although the Fifth Circuit had little difficulty in characterizing plaintiffs
complaint as establishing a per se violation, 540 F.2d at 828, citing McBeath v. Inter-
Am. Citizens for Decency Comm., 374 F.2d 359, 361 (5th Cir. 1967), this is at least a
debatable issue. Application of the Sherman Act requires some adverse effects upon
competition, which can either be proved as unreasonable, Board of Trade of Chicago
v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) (the "rule of reason"), or presumed - per se
offenses - because of their "pernicious effect on competition", Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Since plaintiff at best was merely an employee, and
not a competitor, it is submitted that his alleged banishment from his chosen
occupation cannot be a per se offense. See GAF Corp. v. Circle Floor Co., 463 F.2d 752,
757-58 (2d Cir. 1972). The question of whether it is a per se offense to exclude a
noncompetitor from the market should be distinguished from an attempt by a
noncompetitor to exclude businesses from the market, which has been held within the
per se rule. See McBeath v. Inter-Am. Citizens For Decency Comm., 374 F.2d 359 (5th
Cir. 1967).
The per se rule was not applied to a case alleging loss of employment because
of a group boycott in Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957). In Radovich, plaintiff
alleged that all NFL team owners conspired to blacklist him from playing
professional football due to his prior participation in another competitive league. Id.
at 446-47. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of his complaint and remanded
for trial stating that: "Petitioner's claim need only be 'tested under the Sherman Act's
general prohibition on unreasonable restraints of trade' . . . . We think Radovich is
entitled to an opportunity to prove his charges." Id. at 453-54 quoting Times-Picayune
Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953). Thus, under Radovich, plaintiff
Quinonez' complaint would not make out a per se violation; he should be required to
prove an adverse, anticompetitive effect upon the market, in addition to his own
damages. The court's reliance on Radovich thus appears incorrect since Radovich
stated that when a group boycott causes loss of employment, the claim must be
"tested under the Sherman Act's general prohibition on unreasonable restraints of
trade . . . ." Id. at 453.
The Fifth Circuit also relied on Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Dress Inc., 371 F.2d
332 (7th Cir. 1967), in support of its proposition that such "no-switching" agreements
by competitors are per se violations. 540 F.2d at 829. However, what the Seventh
Circuit actually said in Nichols was:
If, from the facts developed upon further proceedings, it does appear that the
'no-switching' agreement impairs competition in the supply of encyclopedias and
reference books, a question of degree may well arise, or of whether reasonable
latitude may be afforded to protect some legitimate interest of the employers. .
Agreements not to compete are tested by a standard of reasonableness.
371 F.2d at 337. (emphasis added).
Hence, on the closer readings of Radovich and Nichols, it is submitted that
the Fifth Circuit in Quinonez apparently erred as a matter of law in holding that the
complaint stated a per se offense.
41. See note 4 supra. Arguably, this would have been a more satisfactory way for
the litigation to proceed. Although a court of equity will not specifically enforce
employment contracts, here the same result could have been achieved by enjoining
the "no-switching" agreement between member firms of the NASD. Damages, being
wholly prospective, would be difficult to prove. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
Injunctive relief would allow for plaintiffs employment as a securities representative.
42. See note 3 supra. The statute uses the disjunctive "or" to describe the interests
protected whose violation gives standing to the treble damage litigant. A plaintiff
may state a claim for injury to either "business" interests or "property" interests. 15
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cases stressed that plaintiffs were commission salesmen with established
clientele, 43 the Fifth Circuit asserted that the absence of an established
clientele was a distinction without a difference.44 In light of existing federal
court decisions, including a recent Supreme Court pronouncement that
"business or property" means an ongoing commercial enterprise, 45 the Fifth
Circuit's dismissal of defendants' primary argument, as a "distinction
without a difference," seems to be unwarranted.
U.S.C. § 15 (1970). The word "property" has been interpreted separately and more
expansively by the courts, so as to include executory contracts. See North Texas
Producers' Ass'n v. Young, 308 F.2d 235, 243 (5th Cir. 1962); Peller v. International
Boxing Club, 227 F.2d 593, 596 (7th Cir. 1955); Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 231
F. Supp. 72, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
Other forms of economic interests have been held not to be within the scope of
"property" as used in the Clayton Act. See Duff v. Kansas City Star Co., 299 F.2d 320,
325 (8th Cir. 1962) (trademark and goodwill not used for eight years); Martens v.
Barrett, 245 F.2d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 1957) (stock); Peter v. Western Newspaper Union,
200 F.2d 867, 872 (5th Cir. 1953) (stock).
Here, discussion of whether plaintiff had an employment contract with
Merrill Lynch or Shearson giving rise to a protectable "property" interest for antitrust
purposes would probably have required an examination of the applicable state
common law of contracts.
43. See note 21 and accompanying text supra. While the courts have never
specifically articulated the reasons for giving treble damage standing to commission
salesmen in loss of employment cases, there is ample justification for this special
treatment. First, the commission salesman deals directly with an ascertainable
segment of the public and derives his remuneration in proportion to his sales to his
clientele. Thus, while a salesman is not a competitor with his employer, his loss of
employment is an easily quantifiable competitive injury to the public. See GAF Corp.
v. Circle Floor Co., 463 F.2d 752, 757-58 (2d Cir. 1972). Additionally, from the point of
view of the commission salesman plaintiff, his loss of employment is particularly
disastrous because he has lost his clientele and his entire investment of goodwill. He
must build his "business" up from scratch again. This is in contrast to the ordinary
employee's position, whose switch of employers does not involve forfeiture of any
goodwill investment. In this sense, Quinonez is in the same position as an ordinary
employee, since he had no clients with whom to build up goodwill. Likewise, he had
never earned a commission and had not actually demonstrated any ability to serve
the public or improve the competitiveness of the securities business.
44. 540 F.2d at 830. The Fifth Circuit's reliance, id., upon the Nichols dicta (see
text accompanying note 24 supra) was especially inappropriate insofar as it was
inconsistent with Dailey v. Quality School Plan, 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967) (see notes
25-28 and accompanying text supra) where, subsequent to the Nichols decision, the
Fifth Circuit reaffirmed the importance of the fact that plaintiff was a commission
salesman with a clientele. Id. at 487. In Image and Sound Serv. Corp. v. Altec Serv.
Corp., 148 F. Supp. 237 (D. Mass. 1956), the court denied treble damage standing to a
plaintiff who was a newly incorporated franchisor of sound engineering services, but
was unable to solicit any franchisees for his business. Id. at 238-39. The court stated:
"Vines . . . [is] not in point . . . [there] . . . the plaintiff had been engaged in a
business and the alleged injury was to a going concern." 148 F. Supp. at 239
(emphasis added). See note 21 and accompanying text supra. The point is, that far
from being a "distinction without a difference", the courts have treated commission
salesmen with an established clientele as the equivalent of an ongoing commercial
enterprise, notwithstanding the formal employment relationship. See note 43 supra.
45. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972). It is at least arguably
justifiable to treat a commission salesman with an established clientele as an ongoing
commercial enterprise. See note 43 supra. Several courts have so decided. See note 21
supra. However, this should be clearly distinguished from the dicta in Nichols that all
employment loss cases should qualify for § 4 Clayton Act relief. See text accompany-
ing note 24 supra.
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